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Abstract
In recent years empirical studies offer clear evidence on the increasing
importance of intra-industry trade in presence of vertically differentiated
products. These are goods that, within the same industry, are distin-
guished by different quality levels. In the new trade theory and in the
neoclassical literature there is not a well-established methodology to esti-
mate good’s quality in international trade; this contribution presents dif-
ferent methodologies starting from a review of the literature and propos-
ing alternative solutions. In the first part of the paper classical indicators
of intra-industry trade are presented as well as original measures, in the
vein of Aw and Roberts, starting observing the evolution of export to
identify the qualitative changes in absolute terms and relative to com-
petitors. These indicators can be influenced not only by quality shifts
but also by other cyclical and structural factors. To overcome these lim-
itations and give a better interpretation of the underlying phenomenon
we present a micro-founded model that attempts to evaluate the effect of
quality on export demand. This model is based on the underlying rela-
tion between vertical product differentiation, goods substitution effect and
market power of exporting firms. In the last part an econometric method-
ology is presented to estimate price elasticity of volume market share as
function of the difference in price against competitors in an inter-temporal
framework. The policy implications of this research moves from a better
assessment of countries international market positioning and price setting
strategy to the identifications of competitive dynamics based on quality
rather than on prices.
1 Introduction
The constant increase in products’ quality is an important competitive driver
influencing firms’ success in the global market. In recent years empirical studies
(Bernard and Jensen, 2001; Bernard et al., 2003; Hallak and Schott, 2005) offer
clear evidence of the increasing importance of intra-industry trade based on
vertically differentiated products.
Product quality differentiation is relevant both in theoretical debate (Hallak
and Schott, 2005) as well as trade policy design (Fontagne´ et al., 2008). Consid-
ering a frame where products are vertically differentiated and consumers have
preference toward higher quality products turn out that advantages in terms
of productivity result in exports that have higher, not lower prices (Baldwin
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and Harrigan, 2007). This implies that there is not endowment-driven special-
ization across products but, on the contrary, endowment-driven specialization
across varieties within products. Such a shift in our understanding of interna-
tional specialization should leads to different trade policy and prevents us from
drawing conclusions regarding the competitive pressures that high-income coun-
tries face from emerging economies. If, for instance, varieties exported by Italy
and China are too different in quality to be in direct competition, then workers
in the two countries do not compete in production of the same varieties. And if
the different varieties are not very substitutable, there will be only a weak link
between trade and factor prices.
There is therefore the need for proper tools to evaluate the relevance of this
phenomenon. The current available methodologies are heterogeneous as well
because they have been developed with different aims as for different definition
of quality regarded among authors.
In the economic literature the concept of quality does not refer only to partic-
ular physical feature of the products, such as materials or technology embedded.
For Hallak and Schott (2005) product quality refers to all the features, tangible
and intangible, influencing consumers’ economic valuation.
Many methodologies are related with the principle that the quality embed-
ded in product could by captured by its price. This is simplistic, even if it
is a useful shortcut for empirical applications. It is simplistic because it is an
indirect measure of quality based on its effect on prices, which are influenced by
other factors. However the relation occurring between quality level and price is
confirmed as well from theoretical models as empirical tests; among the others
Stiglitz (1987) shows that the relation between quality and price in the long run
subsists even under imperfect information. The most popular proxy of prices
used in trade study is the Average Unit Value (AUV) of exports; the use of AUV
is increasing the interpretation ambiguity: AUV are not strict prices index but
aggregated price proxies, computed as sector or product level aggregated ratio
of trade values on trade quantities . They are although influenced as well by
strict firms’ export prices as by the product mix within the sector.
Moreover it would be important fully understand the economic implications
of quality differentiation and use properly quality measurements in order to
obtain meaningful results; addressing the relation intervening between these
measurement and the market structure. For instance a different quality level
could be the reaction to different factor intensity or technology used in the
production process. A high quality level could be connected also with low good’s
substitution effect and, consequently, different market structure characterized by
lower price elastic of demand and higher market power. On this last point there
is a clear connection between quality measurement, market power and exporters
pricing strategies (Bresnahan, 1989; Goldberg and Knetter, 1995; De Nardis and
Pensa, 2004; Bugamelli and Tedeschi, 2005; Lamieri and Lanza, 2006). In this
respect we can think of indirect measures that attempt to grasp the effects
of quality differentiation on the residual demand addressed to an exporting
country.
In the effort to produce a classification of existing heterogeneity measures
a first distinction can be made between indicators that reveals the weight of
quality differentiation in goods’ trade, compared to indicators that evaluate the
differences and characteristics of qualitative changes. The former is based on
the literature on intra-industry trade resulting from a qualitatively different
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level of imports and exports. The latter indicators identify how qualitative dif-
ferentiation is affecting absolute and relative market power of exporters. These
measurement techniques (presented in section 2) can be applied both for a static
comparison between country and competitors, and for a dynamic assessment of
export quality over time. If dynamic, then, the aim is isolate the effect pro-
duced by improvement or deterioration of traded goods quality. We then derive
a micro-funded model (section 3) based on the relation between qualitative
differentiation, degree of goods’ substitutability and market power, suggesting
some alternatives to existing techniques. Section 4 concludes and suggests some
policy implications. Appendix A specifies an empirical equation based on the
proposed model estimating indirectly quality by an analysis of market power
and the price elasticity of demand.
The description and interpretation of empirical outcomes1 are out of scope
for this contribution, which has a methodological nature. Only the estimated
coefficients of the regression are reported in appendix. This contribution is part
of a larger project on Italian Export Quality realized with the support and sci-
entific contribution of Intesa Sanpaolo s.p.a., Manlio Masi Foundation, Italian
Foreign Trade Institute, Italian Institute for Economic Analysis (ISAE) and
Bank of Italy. The outcomes of the research project, with a full results descrip-
tion and interpretation, have been published in Lanza and Quintieri (2007).
2 Measuring quality variation
2.1 Intra-industry trade and international trade theory
A large body of empirical studies shows that price differentiation across desti-
nation markets is the rule, rather than the exception, in the pricing behavior of
exporters of industrial countries. Exchange rate swings induce firms, endowed
with some degree of market power, to adopt optimal (short run) price strate-
gies. Two main pricing strategies are commonly considered (Basile et al., 2007):
(i) pricing the same good differently according to the markets where it is sold
(pricing-to-market) and (ii) pricing the same good differently to competitors
according to its quality level (vertical-differentiation).
Relevant macroeconomic consequences of both strategies are incomplete ex-
change rate pass-through and deviations from the law of one price, such that the
classical textbook reaction of the current account to exchange rate modifications
(based on the Marshall-Lerner requirements on export and import price elastici-
ties) can be considerably diluted. Necessary conditions for price discrimination,
consequent on exchange rate movements, involve market-structure character-
istics, functional forms of demand faced by firms in the various destination
markets and degree of integration of trading countries.
1From 2000 to 2005 the Italian economy showed a puzzle, combining a sharp decline in
competitiveness with high export prices. Italian market share in volume was 8.9% in 1995,
declined to 6% in 2000 and to 5.7% in 2005. During the same period, unit labour costs
have increased markedly. Yet, between 2004 and the third quarter of 2007 Italian exports
average unit values continued to increase at an average annual rate of 7.5% (Source: Istat,
Italian Statistical Office, www.istat.it). This evidence is even stronger in traditional sectors
where AUV increased also in conjunction with an appreciation of the Euro and an increasing
international competitive pressures (Basile et al., 2007). Empirical evidence shows that Italy
from 2000 to 2005 seems able to defend its position in traditional sectors’ upper market
segment.
3
In this paper we focus on price-setting strategies originated by different
good’s quality levels leading to intra-industry trade and vertical-differentiation.
The intra-industry trade can be originated by a segmented market structure
either by different process along the production chain leading to heterogeneous
product’s quality level among countries2. The portion of trade between two
countries within the same sectors or products (intra-industry trade) can be
revealed by the standard index proposed by Grubel and Lloyd (1975). This in-
dicator regards as intra-industry trade only the bilateral overlapping flows of the
same production; the remainder of trade between two countries is classified as
inter-industry trade. This distinction brings in a theoretical critique to Grubel
and Lloyd (1975) and highlights index’s limitations: it is unlikely suppose to
distinguish between trade flows according to various theories of international
trade, regarding only the intensity of intra-industry trade in a given sector. In
particular, it is simplistic separate sectors with growing scale economies and
imperfect competition on the basis of the existence of two-way trade within
the sector. Two-way intra-industry trade is discussed (Falvey and Kierzkowski,
1987; Davis, 1995; Petrucci and Quintieri, 2001) in the theoretical context of
Heckscher-Ohlin-Ricardo. This assumption is denied by Helpman and Krug-
man (1985) that allows for one-way intra-industry trade flows due entirely to
the very market structure: according to simple New Trade Theory models, two-
way trades are allowed in countries sufficiently dissimilar in size as a consequence
of the home market effect.
Furthermore, theories based on comparative advantages and those based
on market structure may not be entirely alternatives. For example the New
Trade Theory explains better trades at a more disaggregated level, while the
neoclassical theory is better suited to explain trades between aggregates sectors
(Davis and Weinstein, 2003). However in reality it is perfectly acceptable that
trades between country A and country B in a given sector are caused mainly
by the market structure, while trades between country A and country C in that
same sector are due to comparative advantages3.
This issue becomes more relevant introducing the concept of vertical intra-
industry trade, which considers a qualitative distinction between imports and
exports. In this context the use of a dichotomous distinction of flows attributable
to the neoclassical theory or the new trade theory is clearly misleading. This
issue is evident when quality levels match with heterogeneous factorial provision
or differences in production technologies, in this case intra-industry trade is due
to comparative advantages (Falvey and Kierzkowski, 1987).
2.2 Absolute export quality variation
Aw and Roberts (1986) developed a relevant methodology to measure trade
policies effects of quality-upgrade on U.S. imports. It is assumed that, if the
various products categories are vertically differentiated, it could be revealed
by differences in AUV. A prerequisite of this approach, therefore, is focus on
sufficiently homogeneous goods, so the comparison in quantity and AUV is
2However, the latter is less plausible when the comparison is done using high disaggregated
categories (8-10 digits), where products classification already distinguish among quality levels.
3Imagine, for example, that country A and country B are similar, and trade varieties of
the same good, while C, having a different production structure, will benefit from trading the
same good with different countries.
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meaningful4. Moreover, as Aw and Roberts design this methodology for import
flows, so they partition by supplier country. However, while the quality of
exported goods derives essentially from production structure and comparative
advantages (Falvey and Kierzkowski, 1987; Petrucci and Quintieri, 2001), the
factors influencing imports quality are more difficult to reveal (GDP per capita,
internal distribution of income, preferences, demand structure etc.) as pointed
out by Hallak and Schott (2005).
Aw and Roberts calculate a synthetic index, we can define it price-quality
index, as the simple ratio of the total value of all goods imported (exported) in
the sector and the total quantity (PQt).
Considering the products g = 1, ..., n and importing (or exporting) countries
c = 1, ...,m the percentage change of the price-quality index (∆PQt), is as
follows:
∆PQt =
PQt − PQt−1
PQt−1
(1)
where
PQt =
∑
g
∑
c
vtgc∑
g
∑
c
qtgc
vtgc is import (export) value of good g from (to) country c at time t , while
qtgc is the corresponding quantity.
This variation over time is determined by three effects: (i) the evolution of
individual product-country components of the AUV, (ii) the change in sector’s
product composition and (iii) changes in the geographical origin (destination)
of traded goods. In particular, the PQt index can increase either for an increase
of goods AUV, either for a growing share of high AUV goods within the sector,
or for a growing weight of countries exporting (importing) higher AUV goods.
Aw and Roberts use the Tornqvist index to evaluate increase in AUV within
individual product-country combination (∆P˜ t):
∆P˜ t =
∑
g
∑
c
Stgc
P tgc − P t−1gc
P t−1gc
(2)
where
Stgc =
1
2
(
vtgc∑
g
∑
c v
t
gc
+
vt−1gc∑
g
∑
c v
t−1
gc
)
and P tgc =
vtgc
qtgc
The difference between ∆PQt and the Tornqvist index point out the change
in the overall price-quality due to a change in the composition of goods exported
or imported:
∆Qt = ∆PQt −∆P˜ t (3)
The index tracks effect due to composition changes in the product mix and
in supplying (destination) countries. To distinguish these two effects we can
4It is not sufficient Including only goods denominated in the same quantity measurement
units. Indeed, if one sector includes very heterogeneous goods, the comparison between AUV
could be misleading.
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calculate a partial Tornquist index for each of the (product or geographical)
determinant.
We denote this index ∆P˜ i
t
for determinant i:
∆P˜ i
t
=
∑
i
Sti
P ti − P t−1i
P t−1i
(4)
where
Sti =
1
2
( ∑
j v
t
ij∑
i
∑
j v
t
ij
+
∑
j v
t−1
ij∑
i
∑
j v
t−1
ij
)
and P ti =
∑
j
vtij∑
j
qtij
with i, j = g, c
Considering the partial index we can build an indicator that gather sector
composition changes as:
∆Qgt = ∆PQt −∆P˜ gt (5)
Similarly we can estimate changes in the geographical composition of im-
ported or exported goods:
∆Qct = ∆PQt −∆P˜ ct (6)
The product composition index (∆Qgt) have a positive value if there is a shift
towards goods with higher AUV on average. Similarly, if increases the weight
of the countries importing (exporting) higher AUV goods, then the geographic
composition index (∆Qct) shows a positive value. We may think that supplier
countries with highest AUV in the individual goods are also specialized in higher
AUV goods within the considered sector. The same may be true for exports if, in
wealthy markets, exporters setting higher prices on average face higher demand
for sectors with higher AUV on average. Therefore simply summing ∆Qgt +
∆Qct quality change may be overestimated (or underestimated) when there is
a strong correlation between product composition and geographic composition.
Is therefore necessary calculate an interaction term between the two effects
(∆Qcgt):
∆Qcgt = ∆Qt −∆Qgt −∆Qct (7)
We can identify four effects affecting change in the overall price-quality:
the product-country AUV effect (∆P˜ t), the product-composition effect (∆Qgt),
the geographical-composition effect (∆Qct) and the interaction term between
product and geographical composition.
The index ∆PQt can be decomposed as:
∆PQt = ∆P˜ t + ∆Qgt + ∆Qct + ∆Qcgt (8)
The contribution from Menzler-Hokkanen and Langhammer (1994) point
out that the Aw and Roberts approach considers only macro changes rather
neglecting product-country joint effects. Price or composition macro effects
may be generated by the sum of different contributions sometimes with opposite
sign. Considering a sharp increase in the AUV of certain products and a sharp
decrease in others is substantially different from considering many small and
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similar variations at the product-country level, even if the aggregated outcome
can be similar.
The change in the total price-quality is then split, considering the contribu-
tions of individual productions. Menzler-Hokkanen and Langhammer identify
the contribution (Etgc) of each product-country variation on the aggregate price-
quality change as follows:
Etgc =
[(
vtgc∑
g
∑
c q
t
gc
− v
t−1
gc∑
g
∑
c q
t−1
gc
)
−
(
qtgc∑
g
∑
c q
t
gc
− q
t−1
gc∑
g
∑
c q
t−1
gc
)
PQt
]
1
PQt−1
The authors consider
(
vtgc/
∑
g
∑
c q
t
gc − vt−1gc /
∑
g
∑
c q
t−1
gc
)
as the contribu-
tion to the index change, from which a substitution effect is subtracted. Sum-
ming elements we can obtain the overall price-quality variation index:
∆PQt =
∑
g
∑
c
Etgc (9)
The empirical analysis conducted by Menzler, Hokkanen and Langhammer
on chairs’ imports in France identify that some country-product suppliers have
a strong influence on the variation of the aggregate price-quality. This method-
ology, therefore, may provide new insight on the determinants affecting ∆PQt.
The contribution of Menzler-Hokkanen and Langhammer (1994) compares em-
pirical outcomes from the Menzler, Hokkanen and Langhammer and the Aw
and Roberts’ approach highlighting that Menzler, Hokkanen and Langhammer
methodology miss the different overall effects (AUV internal variation and com-
position).
To tackle these difficulties we consider both the outlined concepts together.
Our method, in fact, decomposes the variation in aggregate price-quality (∆PQt)
between overall effects (similar to Aw and Roberts) and the composition effect
in each product-market.
As in Aw and Roberts (1986) the variation in aggregate price-quality (PQt)
is calculated as the ratio of total value on quantity of exported goods. The
variation of this indicator is therefore split into three different overall effects.
The internal effect (∆P t) aims to capture the AUV variation within the indi-
vidual product-country combination between two periods in time. It is derived
from a weighted average of percentage changes in the individual elements’ AUV.
To prevent that the internal effect is influenced by changes in the products mix
or geographic mix each variation is weighed according to the share of this com-
ponent in exports (imports) at the initial period. We first identify an effect on
the single product-market and then a total index derived from the sum of each
effect:
∆P tgc =
vt−1gc∑
g
∑
c v
t−1
gc
P tgc − P t−1gc
P t−1gc
with P tgc =
vtgc
qtgc
(10)
The overall price index, therefore, match with the Laspeyres index:
∆P t =
∑
g
∑
c
∆P tgc (11)
The exported product-mix variation is hit by the composition effect (∆Ct).
This indicator shows a positive value if, in the sector, it is present a growing
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share of exports (imports) in product-market with AUV higher than average.
A positive composition effect may reveal a quality improvement being based
on a change in the exported (imported) goods or a modification in the supply
(demand) markets composition. Although it is possible to distinguish between a
product and geographic composition effect, it seems more appropriate consider
the overall indicator joint with the information embedded in the product-country
partition to hit goods and markets that have affected most the aggregate out-
come. For any product-country pair the composition effect is defined as:
∆Ctgc =
P t−1gc − PQt−1
PQt−1
(
qtgc∑
g
∑
c q
t
gc
− q
t−1
gc∑
g
∑
c q
t−1
gc
)
(12)
and in aggregate terms as:
∆Ct =
∑
g
∑
c
∆Ctgc (13)
The last effect, defined combined effect (∆CBt), takes a positive value if, in
the sector, increases the market share of goods showing a significant increase
in AUV, or decreases the weight of product-country with a below average AUV
variation. The combined effect (∆CBtgc) for each element is given by:
∆CBtgc =
(
P tgc − P t−1gc
)− (PQt − PQt−1)
PQt−1
(
qtgc∑
g
∑
c q
t
gc
− q
t−1
gc∑
g
∑
c q
t−1
gc
)
and at the macro level:
∆CBt =
∑
g
∑
c
∆CBtgc (14)
By summing the calculated effects we can determine the contribution of each
combination product-country (Etgc) to the changes in the overall price-quality
variation:
Etgc = ∆P
t
gc + ∆C
t
gc + ∆CB
t
gc (15)
Moreover, Etgc is designed in accordance with the Menzler-Hokkanen and
Langhammer’s contribution. The variation in the aggregate price-quality can
be obtained either by adding the overall effects, or by aggregating the individual
product-market contributions:
∆PQt = ∆P t + ∆Ct + ∆CBt =
∑
g
∑
c
Etgc (16)
The above described methodology may provide useful insight on the in im-
ports qualitative variation but, while analyzing exports, it is more relevant esti-
mate the goods’ quality in a specific country in relation with those of competi-
tors. Moreover, these export quality variation measurements does not account
for shifts in the geographical structure of world’s demand, how this shift affect
the traded product composition and how has been affected AUV of competing
goods in different markets. In the next paragraph we will present a quality
estimation which incorporates these dynamics.
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2.3 Relative export quality variation
Assessing the exports quality of a country against competitors and its evolu-
tion over time can be an important contribution in understanding the country
positioning in international trade markets5.
Indeed, we cannot rely only on the cross-sector specialization to understand
the country specific pattern of trade and analyze its strengths and weaknesses.
In some case it may be relevant understand whether a country’s exports are
concentrated in qualitatively high or low segments within sectors. Referring to
the comparative advantages frame the intra-sector quality specialization may
be as relevant as the inter-sector specialization.
Given a benchmark market, which may be the world market, we propose6
to compute as an overall index measuring the difference in price and quality
among the reference exporting country i and the benchmark M . This price-
quality difference (ΓPQti) is the percentage difference between the price-quality
indicator seen previously computed for country i and for the total world M
exports:
ΓPQti =
PQti − PQtM
PQtM
with PQtj =
∑
g v
t
gj∑
g q
t
gj
j = i,M (17)
The indicator is positive if overall prices-quality of exported goods from
country i are higher than global values. Again the aggregate indicator is deter-
mined by various effects, the price-quality effect is summarized by the following
relation:
ΓPQti = ΓP
t
i + ΓC
t
i + ΓCB
t
i (18)
Goods with higher AUV than world average are exported first. This is
shown by the internal differentiation index (ΓP ti ) that is computed as a weighted
average of country i’s AUV for each considered product.
ΓP ti =
∑
g
qtgM∑
g q
t
gM
P tgi − P tgM
PQtM
with P tgj =
vtgj
qtgj
j = i,M (19)
The weights applied to the average are based on the share of each good in
world exports for the sector. This procedure excludes that a country specializa-
tion would influence the internal differentiation index. Within a sector, in fact,
a country may be specialized in products with high or low AUV. Overall this
phenomenon is captured by the indicator defined composition difference ΓCti .
The composition difference is positive if the share of export with higher AUV
is larger in country i than the overall world exports’ share. It is calculated as
follows:
ΓCti =
∑
g
P tgM − PQtM
PQtM
(
qtgi∑
g q
t
gi
− q
t
gM∑
g q
t
gM
)
(20)
5In this section only export trade flows are considered, appearing the comparison to com-
petitors a more meaningful measure for exports. However, it is meaningful fit this methodology
to estimate a qualitative comparison between imports of two or more countries.
6This measurement method is somehow similar to the one described by Capotorti (1983).
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Finally the combined difference indicator (ΓCBti ) has positive value if the
country i is specialized in productions in which the AUV of its exports are higher
than that of world exports.
ΓCBti =
∑
g
P tgi − P tgM
PQtM
(
qtgi∑
g q
t
gi
− q
t
gM∑
g q
t
gM
)
(21)
Unlike ΓCti , the effect of combined difference does not evaluate whether there
is a specialization in production showing overall higher quality. Instead, the
combined difference accounts for sectors in which country’s exports have AUV
higher than its competitors. A positive value, therefore, reveals a strong market
power or a high quality level in those productions in which the country shows a
specialization, while exports have AUV higher than competitors. Indeed, AUV
higher in some productions would derive mainly from factors other than quality
as lower production efficiency; we would expect the country specializing in these
goods. Both the aggregate indicator of price-quality difference (ΓPQti) and the
decomposed indexes can be calculated in different time frames; index variations
can be used to assess changes in quality.
As in all the measurements that compare different scales, we must take
into account the fact that changes of these indicators depends on the dynamics
of different variables. In particular, both the shift of country i export quota
and the changes in world exports contribute jointly to indexes change. It is not
possible to distinguish the two effects within this simple framework; next section
tries to overcome these interpretative limitations proposing a quality estimation
methodology based on price elasticity of export demand.
3 The quality effect on price elasticity of exports
residual demand
One of the problems that emerge measuring relative quality (ΓP ti ) lies in un-
derstanding the determinants of differences in the AUV of individual goods.
Similarly, when analyzing changes in absolute quality, the internal dynamics
of each combination product-country (∆P t) lends itself to different interpreta-
tions. The key question is to understand if, for example, positive values of ΓP ti
suggests a higher quality level towards competitors and, to what extent, positive
values of ∆P t reflect an improvement in quality. Other contingent factors (e.g.
exchange rate fluctuations) and structural factors (e.g. loss of competitiveness)
could affect the export prices beside quality variation. Moreover, if we account
for AUV and not individual exporting firms prices, higher AUV can be induced
by low-quality producers leaving the market. In this case the increased average
quality level of exports will not imply a quality upgrade intended as a strategy
pursued by producers of a certain sector.
We saw in the previous section as the combined difference indicator (ΓCBti ),
may provide some evidence that highest AUV are actually related to higher qual-
ity level. But this is partial information: any horizontal differentiation among
goods, even without qualitative differences, leads to differences in competitors
prices (Meltiz, 2003). In this case, a less efficient country, with higher produc-
tion costs, could be forced to charge higher prices. But we must stress that, if
the country is specialized in the high-price production, we would have further
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evidence in favor of a higher quality of its exports pointing out that the country
faces a less tough competition. A similar methodology has been proposed by
Hallak and Schott (2005).
In this vein we can derive an indirect quality estimation based on the re-
lation intervening between vertical differentiation and market power. We can
refer at market power as the ability of a firm - or a set of exporters - to charge
prices above the competitors while it has resilient position in destination mar-
kets. Quality, as not observable attribute, directly influences the degree of con-
sumer’s preference and therefore affects market power of high quality segments
exporters. We can then use market power, or the level of substitutability be-
tween country i products and those of competitors, as proxy of exports quality.
The market power is not only influenced by the degree of vertical differentiation,
but also from other factors related primarily to the very structure of the mar-
ket7 and the presence of entry barriers8. Assuming that vertical differentiation
is the predominant element of market power it then is more plausible focus on
industries with a low supply concentration and a competitive environment near
free market9.
Section 3.1 presents a theoretical justification of the relationship between
price elasticity of demand and quality changes. In particular it will prove that
elasticity in absolute value would be lower if there is vertical goods differentia-
tion.
3.1 A micro-founded model with vertically differentiated
products
The choice of using price elasticity of market share10 to estimate exports quality
is based on the assumption that the products have different inherent characteris-
tics (Lancaster, 1979) leading to different consumer’s reactions to price changes
(Chiarlone, 2000).
Let’s consider an economy divided in s sectors, whose products meet sim-
ilar needs; the representative consumer’s utility function U aggregates utility
associated with each sector us in utility level U = U (u1, u2, . . . un). Assum-
ing function U separable in its components, the consumer splits her disposable
income I attributing spending to the different sectors I = I1 + I2 + · · · + In.
Let’s assume that goods in sector j are primarily differentiated by country of
origin (Armington, 1969) and that sub-utilities (uj) shows additive preferences
addi-log, as described in Houthakker (1960) and Clarida (1996). The represen-
tative consumer, therefore, address the following maximization problem for each
sector:
7Factors as market concentration, the span of control of the enterprise on the distribution
chain and vertical integration.
8Protectionism and in particular tariffs and non-tariffs barriers, incentives and regulations
that limit competition.
9We expect these conditions being plausible for Italian traditional sectors, given the in-
creasing international markets integration. Traditional sectors, at least in Italy, are generally
characterized by small medium enterprises with small-scale structure and relatively low fixed-
costs and a low-regulation that facilitate new players’ entry.
10In this section we use the term share to refer to the relationship between quantity exported
from one country and those of competitors in a given market. Although this ratio indicates
proper volume market share, we believe that the relationship between the two concepts is so
tight to make this approximation acceptable.
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max u =
X1−α1c
1− α1 +
X1−α2i
1− α2
t.c. I ≤ PiXi + PcXc
where Pi and Pc are respectively the price of goods from country i and
competing country c and X is the amount consumed of the two goods. The pa-
rameters α1 and α2 are both positive and determine the shape of the indifference
curves, therefore, the marginal substitution rate between the two products.
We can introduce quality differentiation following the specification of Lan-
caster (1979) whereas a further variable (Q) expresses the tangible and intan-
gible products quality exported.
Assume further that better quality imply higher price. Prices, therefore, are
also functions of goods quality, according to the relations Pi = P (Qi, Gi) and
Pc = P (Qc, Gc) , where G is an exogenous variable gathering price variations
due to factors other than quality. G can be influenced also by factors such as
country labor cost, sector productivity, exchange rate movements and pricing
strategies implemented by exporters, irrespective of products quality changes.
Function P , therefore, depends positively on quality ∂P∂C > 0 and exogenous
shocks ∂P∂G > 0.
Trade-off between price and quality level is implicit in this relation. Increas-
ing quality has double impact of inverse sign on demand. On one hand a higher
quality means higher price, which impacts negatively on the amount demanded,
on the other quality increases the marginal consumer’s utility, increasing the
demand. We can derive this hypothesis formally starting from maximizing the
utility of a representative agent with preference toward quality:
max u =
X1−α1c Q
γ
c
1− α1 +
X1−α2i Q
γ
i
1− α2
t.c. I ≤ PiXi + PcXc
where the parameter γ > 0 is the preference attached by the consumer to
quality. This parameter is sector and market specific11.
From the utility constrained maximization (22) we obtain the residual de-
mand towards country i exporters:
Xi = X
α1
α2
c
(
Qi
Qc
) γ
α2
(
Pi
Pc
)− 1α2
(22)
with a logarithmic transformation we get:
X˜i =
α1
α2
X˜c +
γ
α2
Q˜i − γ
α2
Q˜c +
1
α2
P˜c − 1
α2
P˜i (23)
where Z˜ = ln (Z).
The quality impact on the residual demand is captured by h =
(
Qi
Qc
) γ
α2 .
The preference parameter γ, is relevant in determine the effect of qualitative
11Hallak and Schott (2005) have tested empirically the importance of quality preference
differentiation among different markets and sectors, to warrant international trade flows.
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differentiation on demand. In particular, consumer has no preference towards
better quality goods where γ = 0. It follows that h will be equal 1 and the
quality effect will be zero: it is a perfectly competitive market, where the amount
demanded depends solely upon price. In other instances, if country i exports
products superior to those of competitors (Qi > Qc), quality differentiation will
have a positive impact on residual demand.
We can now derive the quality shift effect on demand for country i. Assum-
ing no strategic interaction between competitors on price or goods quality, the
elasticity of demand to a variation of Qi will be given by:
∂X˜i
∂Q˜i
=
γ
α2︸︷︷︸
+
− 1
α2
∂P˜i
∂Q˜i︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
(24)
As suggested earlier, because ∂P˜i
∂Q˜i
> 0, an increase in quality has a dual
impact on demand opposite in sign. The overall effect on the variation of the
residual demand addressed to country i is not univocal, but it depends on con-
sumer preference attached to quality (γ) and on the qualitative change effect on
price ( ∂P˜i
∂Q˜i
).
If we consider price elasticity of demand not depending on quality shift,
recalling ∂P˜i
∂G˜i
> 0, we observe that:
∂X˜i
∂G˜i︸︷︷︸
−
= − 1
α2
∂P˜i
∂G˜i︸︷︷︸
+
(25)
A positive shock of G˜i corresponds to a decrease in demanded quantity.
Dividing by ∂P˜i and multiplying by ∂G˜i we get:
∂X˜i
∂P˜i
= − 1
α2
(26)
This equation describes the price elasticity of demand due to a price change
caused only by factors other than quality12. The impact of a price shock not
dependent on quality is equal to the price elasticity in case of not vertically-
differentiated goods (Chiarlone, 2000)13.
Whereas price P˜i is function of Q˜i and of G˜i, and assuming constant price
and quality of competitors, the demand X˜i depends ultimately upon Q˜i and G˜i.
Then we can express the differential equation X˜i in the form:
12The result from (26) is obtained from the partial derivative of X˜i respect to G˜i, assuming
other variables, including Q˜i, stay constant.
13If the goods are not qualitatively differentiated the simplified form utility would be u =
X˜
1−α1
c
1−α1 +
X˜
1−α2
i
1−α2 . By maximizing the agent utility under budget constraint we get the demand
function X˜i = X˜
α1/α2
c (P˜i/P˜c)
−1/α2 . The price elasticity in the case of homogeneous goods
is therefore ∂X˜i/∂P˜i = −1/α2.
13
dX˜i =
∂X˜i
∂Q˜i
dQ˜i +
∂X˜i
∂G˜i
dG˜i
=
(
γ
α2
− 1
α2
∂P˜i
∂Q˜i
)
dQ˜i − 1
α2
∂P˜i
∂G˜i
dG˜i
=
γ
α2
dQ˜i − 1
α2
(
∂P˜i
∂Q˜i
dQ˜i +
∂P˜i
∂G˜i
dG˜i
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
dP˜i
dX˜i =
γ
α2
dQ˜i − 1
α2
dP˜i
dividing both members by dP˜i we get:
dX˜i
dP˜i
=
γ
α2
dQ˜i
dP˜i
− 1
α2
(27)
Comparing results obtained from (27) and from (26), we can highlight price
elasticity of demand in case of a quality shift. When the price changes depend
solely upon exogenous factors (Gi) thus ∂X˜i∂P˜i = −
1
α2
as in the case of not dif-
ferentiated goods. If the price change is also linked to changes in the quality of
products, the elasticity depends on a further component: γα2
dQ˜i
dP˜i
. This factor in
turn has affected the importance attached by consumers to quality (γ > 0) with
the factor dQ˜i
dP˜i
, which is the converse of quality variation elasticity of price. So
if P (Q,G) is always differentiable and monotonous-growing in Q, as we have as-
sumed, the component dQ˜i
dP˜i
will be positive and inversely proportional to quality
variation on prices. We can therefore state that:
γ
α2
dQ˜i
dP˜i
− 1
α2
> − 1
α2
(28)
In summary, the price elasticity of demand, in a context of vertical products
differentiation reduces (in absolute value) as the quality of exported products
increases.
We derive this result assuming that price, quantity and quality of competing
goods remain unchanged and analyzing the variations, in absolute terms, of
country i factors. However, it is relevant consider also the relative variables’
dynamics including strategic interaction. For example, what is the impact on
market share if the price or quality of exported goods grows in excess compared
to competitors? Introducing the assumption α1 = α2 = α, we can rewrite the
demand function (22) entirely in relative terms 14:
14The assumption α1 = α2 = α in presence of quality differentiation seems quite plausible.
Indeed, if α1 differed from α2, this would imply that consumers have a preference, a priori
and unchanging over time, for a specific country’s products, regardless of the tangible and
intangible characteristics (Q). The reputation of a country in the production of a certain
sector, even if present, is variable over time, and quality standards must be maintained so that
this advantage will not erode over the long term. This assumption would not be plausible in the
frame of import demand, whereas consumer tent to be bias towards home country products.
14
Xi
Xc
=
(
Qi
Qc
) γ
α
(
Pi
Pc
)− 1α
(29)
in logarithmic form:
x˜ic =
γ
α
q˜ic − 1
α
p˜ic (30)
where z˜ab = ln (Za/Zb).
We can analyze the elasticity of the ratio of exported quantity (which we
will call for simplicity shares) to changes in relative prices and quality Using the
same derivation seen above. Again, if changes in relative prices are not linked
to changes in quality (Qi/Qc), the elasticity is simply equal to −1/α. If we
encounter changes in quality, the relative price elasticity of volume share will
decline.
dx˜ic
dp˜ic
=
γ
α
dq˜ic
dp˜ic
− 1
α
> − 1
α
(31)
Appendix A suggests an empirical regression exercise based on the above
model.
4 Conclusions and policy implications
The measurement of goods’ quality in international trade and its dynamic is
undoubtedly an ambitious goal. In modern economic literature several methods
have been proposed, some of which are analyzed, compared and extended in
this contribution. Original solutions are presented to overcome specific inter-
pretative limitations of standard methods. The first part of this work presents
intra-trade indicators, assessing the importance of vertical differentiation in in-
ternational trade. Than a methodology inspired by Aw and Roberts contribu-
tion is presented: the first part study the evolution of export and the impact of
absolute quality variations; the second part examine the effect of relative qual-
ity variation on country’s export versus competitors. These indicators can be
influenced by quality variations but also by other structural and cyclical factors
(competitive advantages, exchange rate, producer price index, labor cost, etc.).
The last part of the paper presents a micro-founded model based on the relation
between vertical product differentiation, good’s substitutability and exporter’s
market power showing that an increase in export quality can lead to a lower
residual demand elasticity.
A strong firm selection process is in place in Europe and vertical differ-
entiation of products may profoundly impact trade policies. Most theories of
intra-industry trade predict that countries enjoying greater productivity will
ship low-price varieties. Many trade policies are inspired by this framework
but predictions conflict with the presented model and empirical evidences. As
it turns out, advantages in terms of productivity result in exports that have
higher, not lower prices (Baldwin and Harrigan, 2007). This implies that there
is not endowment-driven specialization across products, but on the contrary,
endowment-driven specialization across varieties within products. Such a shift
This is not the case in the proposed model because we avoid including the incumbent in the
home market among country i competitors.
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in our understanding of international specialization should leads to different
trade policy and prevents us from drawing conclusions regarding the compet-
itive pressures that high-income countries face from emerging economies. If
varieties exported by Italy and China are too different in quality to be in direct
competition, then workers in the two countries do not compete in production
of the same varieties. And if the different varieties are not very substitutable,
there will be only a weak link between trade and factor prices.
Insights into country relative export quality and its international specializa-
tion improve our understanding of the dynamics of international competition
and leads to some policy conclusions for developed economies. We are observ-
ing shifts in world market shares, with a decreasing in export values share from
developed country, actually mirroring this dissimilarity in the specialization of
countries at different levels of development within products and across varieties.
The popular view that the South is gaining market shares inexorably is too over-
simplified; it cannot support sound policy conclusions for advanced economies
if it does not include a detailed analysis of price-setting strategy and the quality
differentiation among countries. These shifts profoundly differ among market
segments, and different countries will be differently affected.
Empirical evidence (Lanza and Quintieri, 2007) shows that Italy from 2000
to 2005 seems able to defend its position in traditional sectors’ upper market
segment. This leads to trade policy oriented to stimulate quality upgrade by
technological shift in traditional sectors, rather than defend internal prices with
barriers. Such a shift in production technologies may well have an impact simi-
lar to biased technical progress and be detrimental to low-skilled, less adaptable
workers. Exporters in emerging economies may not threaten the relative posi-
tion of unskilled labor in Europe through direct competition in product markets,
but indirectly through the labor market effects of up-market positioning strate-
gies adopted by European firms in response to international competition.
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A Estimating Quality
The proposed export demand function specification refers to the theoretical
structure described in the previous section (3.1). Therefore, we have to establish
a functional form that relates the market shares in quantity, at the product-
market level, with exporter’s relative price, controlling for structural and cyclical
factors affecting demand.
Xmgit
Xmgct
= f
(
Pmgit
Pmgct
,Ψmgit ,Θit
)
where Xmgit /X
mg
ct is the ratio between the amount of country i exports and
those of competitors in the market m for good g, while Pmgit /P
mg
ct is the rela-
tion between their average unit values. Ψmgit includes all the structural factors
that affect country’s positioning in a specific product and market. Referring to
gravity models, the structural variables include the Euclidean distance between
countries, the relationship between economies size and the level of specializa-
tion in the considered productions. Θit instead captures the cyclical effects
influencing uniformly the residual demand of a country on all target markets
and industries.
Using a logarithmic specification, we can express relative export demand as
follows:
log
(
Xmgit
Xmgct
)
= pi + β log
(
Pmgit
Pmgct
)
+ log (Ψmgit ) + δ log (Θt) + ε
mg
t (32)
In order to measure dynamic changes in quality we have to compare different
periods. The model presented, introducing structural effects specific to each
product-market combination (Ψmgit ), considers the inter-temporal, cross-product
and cross-market dimensions jointly, limiting the needs of long time series. If
we estimate the elasticity for short time periods it is reasonable assuming that
structural variables, characterizing each product-market combination, remain
constant over time. The equation (32) can be rewritten as follows:
log
(
Xmgit
Xmgct
)
= pi + β log
(
Pmgit
Pmgct
)
+ log (Ψmgi ) + δ log (Θit) + ε
mg
t (33)
where Ψmgi is considered constant over time, although obviously varying
through target product-market combinations. Ψmgi can therefore take into ac-
count all factors (observable and not observable), which affect country’s posi-
tioning in a specific market and production, simply using heterogeneous-individual
panel model. Specifically, it is natural believe in a correlation between these
variables and the structural price differential log (Pmgit /P
mg
ct ), the most suitable
estimators seems fix-effect (within-group and first-difference)15. The exports
15We considers structural effects as the distance between the exporting country and the
destination market. Transportation costs, which usually affect exported goods’ price creating
a correlation between distance and relative prices, depend upon structural effects. Moreover,
the quality in different product-market combinations can be considered a structural variable
not observable, correlated with the relative prices that can be estimated through the fix-effect.
19
demand function is expressed in structural form. To cope with simultane-
ity between demand and supply instrumental variables are introduced: pro-
duction price index for the considered sector and lagged endogenous variable
(Pmgi(t−1)/P
mg
c(t−1)). Moreover high disaggregated export data categories (HS 2002,
6-digits) by destination country are used in order to cope with relatively short
time frame.
The presented model has been estimated (coefficients in appendix) for Ital-
ian exports in the traditional sectors: footwear; glass and glassware; ceramic
products; wine; vegetable oil and furniture.
The product-level data sources are Eurostat COMTRADE and Istat CON-
ISTAT, the classification used is Harmonized System (HS) at 6-digits level.
The time frame considered is 1995-2005 and two sub periods (1995-2000 and
2001-2005) in the aim to compare the elasticity shift over time. We selected
the product-market combinations covering 90 % of total Italian exports in each
considered sector.
The structural factors Ψmgit is considered invariant over time and estimated
as fix-effect. The cyclical factor Θit is included as annual dummy variables 16.
Estimation coefficients are reported in appendix: OLS estimates are pro-
posed as benchmark, then a linear fixed-effect model with first-order autoregres-
sive disturbance GLS-AR(1)17 and a 2SLS model are estimated and compared.
The correlation between individual effects and other explanatory variables has
been confirmed by Hausmann tests for comparison between model with fixed
effects and variance components.
Finally, to cope with endogeneity of the independent variable log (Pmgit /P
mg
ct )
due to simultaneity between demand and supply, instrumental variables are used
(IV) and two-stage Least Squares (2SLS).
For detailed description and interpretation of the empirical analysis refer to
Lanza and Quintieri (2007). It is beyond the scope of this paper that has a
methodological nature.
16The annual dummy are significance at 95% only for the footwear sector.
17The fixed effects estimator for GLS-AR is computed first estimating a standard fixed effect
OLS, the result is then used to estimate the degree of autocorrelation of residuals. Given this
estimate, hatρ, the Cochran-Orcutt transformation is applied for each panel. Finally, the
within-group average is computed and added to the global average for each variable. The β
coefficients are produced with OLS on the transformed dataset
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